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Abstract 
 
Port of Rotterdam Authority is a publicly owned but corporatized port development 
company. In 2004, this organisation was transformed from a municipal department to an 
independently operating company. The corporatisation intended to improve the overall 
performance of the port of Rotterdam. Relevant performance indicators to evaluate the effect 
of this corporatisation include market share, turnover, operating costs, profits, and 
investments. These indicators are evaluated for two periods, one prior to the corporatisation 
(1997-2003) and the other afterwards (2005-2011). The comparison of these two periods 
shows that corporatisation has led to significant performance improvements. This finding is 
relevant for the ongoing discussion on port governance models. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
port authority, port governance, corporatisation, performance evaluation, Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, case study 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
In the past decades, many governments devolved the responsibility for port development to a 
port authority. These organisations compete for attracting cargoes and investments and they 
are increasingly regarded as commercial organisations, for instance, in EU court cases. 
Verhoeven (2010) identifies pressure from three stakeholders as drivers behind port 
governance reform. First, market players like carriers, terminal operators, and logistics 
operators, voice their preference for port authorities that leave port operations to private firms 
and create favourable conditions for private initiative (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001). 
Second, governments increasingly question government spending in ports through (implicit) 
subsidies, implying that port authorities should become self-sustaining. Third, NGO’s and 
community groups hold port authorities responsible for negative externalities generated by 
the port, such as congestion and environmental damage. Effectively dealing with such 
stakeholders often requires changing prevailing port governance practices. These pressures 
establish the need for reform and ask attention for developing an appropriate governance 
structure for port authorities. 
 
In this paper, we analyse the effects of corporatisation of the Port of Rotterdam Authority 
(written henceforth as PoR), which was realized in 2004. Three main arguments were brought 
forward to argue that corporatisation would improve the performance of PoR. The first 
argument followed the general trend in the 1990s to reduce public involvement in economic 
activities, leading to the liberalization of services like public transport and energy provision, 
generally with positive results for users (Boardman and Vining, 1989). The second argument 
was to improve supply chain integration and international transport networks, as municipal 
organisations often focus more on local economic development than on the broader supply 
chain perspective. The third argument was that municipal administrations have limited 
capabilities for commercial activities, whereas port development requires an active approach 
of customers and business case driven investments (see Xiao et al, 2012, for examples of 
overcapacity due to public investments in port infrastructure not driven by a business case).  
The municipal organisation constrains commercial operation, partly because the municipal 
labour conditions make it difficult to hire commercially skilled employees. 
 
The PoR case considered in this paper sheds light on performance effects of corporatisation. 
The considered performance indicators include market share, turnover, operating costs, 
 3
profits, and investments. The results for this case are relevant for the ongoing discussion on 
port governance, see, among others, Goss (1990), Baird (2002), Brooks and Cullinane (2007), 
Ng and Pallis (2010), and Verhoeven and Vanoutrive (2012).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous (case) studies on port 
governance reform, and Section 3 introduces the PoR case. Section 4 describes the set of 
relevant performance indicators for PoR, and Section 5 provides tests for the comparison of 
these indicators before and after corporatisation. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Previous case studies on port governance 
 
The common approach to the question which governance model is effective in which 
situation, is to identify public interests defined in a strict economic sense (Samuelson, 1948; 
Baumol, 1964) and assess appropriate mechanisms to secure these public interests.  Public 
ownership is one mechanism to secure public interests, whereas regulation of a fully private 
industry is an alternative option. The appropriate option differs for different types of ports 
and depends, amongst others, on the diversity of the port (Cullinane and Song, 2002) and the 
relevance of land-use conflicts between port and urban functions (Pellegram, 2001). For 
general overviews of port governance and public interests we refer to Cullinane and Song 
(2002) and Brooks and Pallis (2011); for the case of the UK, the only country with a fully 
private port industry, see Asteris and Collins (2010).   
 
Various case studies on port governance reform suggest convergence of the institutional 
position of port authorities, with persistent regional differences (Hall, 2003). Everett (2007) 
discusses the case of Australia, one of the countries that implemented port reform relatively 
early. Here the transfer of government-owned monopolies to privately owned monopolies has 
gone hand-in-hand with the introduction of a regulatory regime that protects the interests of 
users but constrains pricing policies and reinvestment strategies of port operators. Everett 
argues for an integrated regulatory approach for the entire supply chain instead of for the 
ports only. Indeed, regulations have later been loosened, based partly on such a supply chain 
perspective. 
 
Lacoste and Douet (2012) describe port reform in France, which introduced a separation 
between the role of a landlord and the role of a terminal operator. Equipment and staff are no 
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longer owned respectively hired by the landlord but by the operator. The French reform 
increased autonomy of the landlord port authority, and specified the composition of the 
supervisory council of the port authority. Political, institutional (e.g. chamber of commerce), 
and labour representatives form the majority of the supervisory council. For Portugal, 
Marques and Fonseca (2010) discuss how the need for private funding led to a shift towards 
the landlord model. They describe how port reform led to a three-tired structure of regulators, 
port authorities, and port operators. The port authorities no longer have a regulatory role. The 
authors stress the important issue of monitoring potential abuse of market power by port 
authorities in ports with mainly captive hinterlands. Castillo-Manzano and Asencio-Flores 
(2012) describe port reform in Spain, where greater autonomy has been given to landlord port 
authorities. The authors warn for potential risks of more autonomous port authorities, 
especially if they are still governed by politically appointed boards. In particular, they may be 
liable to take large financial risks, such as borrowing and investing more than would seem 
economically justified or lowering tariffs to attract additional cargoes.  
 
Chen (2009) discusses port reform in Taiwan and questions the port authority’s dual role as a 
regulator and as an operator. Instead, Chen recommends restructuring Taiwanese port 
authorities through port corporatization. In 2012, the Taiwanese government did indeed 
decide to set up the Taiwan International Ports Corporation Ltd that manages all four main 
ports of Taiwan and no longer has a regulatory role.  
 
From the above cases, we can draw some broad conclusions. First, port reform is an ongoing 
process that is implemented stepwise, as an effort to re-establish a fit between the port’s 
operating environment and the strategy and structure of the port (Baltazar and Brooks, 2007; 
World Bank, 2007; Verhoeven, 2010). Second, port reform processes are time and place 
dependent (Jacobs, 2007; Ng and Pallis, 2010; Notteboom et al, 2012). Third, 
notwithstanding the diversity of port governance models and the need to account for 
differences in political culture (Ng and Pallis, 2010), most reform trajectories share a 
common direction towards a port industry where a landlord port authority is regarded as a 
commercial undertaking and where the appropriate regulatory framework is in place. Ng and 
Gujar (2009) discuss potential dangers of implementing `Western solutions' in developing 
economies, but the evidence in many developing countries supports this broadly defined 
common direction (Van Niekerk, 2005).  
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The above findings show the relevance of analyzing the effects of port reform in countries 
that have landlord port authorities that are regarded as a commercial undertaking. Such 
countries include Australia, Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Up to now, an analysis 
of the performance of the port authority after reform is still largely lacking. Various studies 
have addressed the effects of port reform on the efficiency of terminals (see Cullinane et al, 
2002; Tongzon and Heng, 2005; and Cheon et al, 2010).  The contribution of this paper is to 
provide an empirical analysis of the effects of corporatisation on the performance of a port 
authority, more specifically, the Port of Rotterdam Authority.  
 
3. Port of Rotterdam Authority 
 
The port of Rotterdam is the largest port of Europe for liquid bulk, dry bulk, and containers. 
The port is developed and managed by the Port of Rotterdam Authority (PoR, in Dutch: 
‘Havenbedrijf Rotterdam’). PoR was corporatized to become a limited company in 2004. The 
mission and role of PoR remained the same, that is, ‘to strengthen the position of the 
Rotterdam port and industrial complex at the European level, now and in the long term’. PoR 
still is a not-for-profit organisation that aims to generate sufficient return to be able to 
continue to invest in a vital port complex. PoR does not aim to maximise profits, but it is 
financially self-sustaining and provides dividend to its shareholders. The desired return on 
invested capital is roughly equal to the weighted average capital costs of around 7-9 percent. 
 
Prior to 2004, PoR was a department of the city administration. PoR could operate rather 
autonomously, although it was controlled by the city council. Reasons for autonomy were the 
need to sign confidential agreements, which should not be discussed in public in the city 
council, and the need to act quickly and settle deals in negotiations. PoR had substantial 
freedom to participate in new ventures. The municipal monitoring and control of PoR was 
limited, partly because of the granted autonomy and partly because of the limited power of 
the municipal administration. The lack of monitoring had adverse effects and led to some 
risky and questionable participations and transactions of PoR.  
 
In January 2004, the institutional position of PoR changed from a municipal department to a 
public corporation. The municipality of Rotterdam remains the majority shareholder of PoR, 
and the national government acquired a minority share of roughly 30%. Instead of providing 
state subsidies to port development, a common practice in the port industry, the Dutch state 
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provided around € 700 million equity to PoR, which allowed PoR to invest in a major 
expansion project.  
 
The main institutional change of the corporatisation was a new corporate governance 
structure with more autonomy from the municipality of Rotterdam. The supervisory board 
monitors the organization, approves major decisions, and appoints and monitors the executive 
board (De Langen and Van der Lugt, 2006). The members of the supervisory board were 
hired from outside and all have substantial private sector experience in managing (public) 
corporations, transport and energy industries, and stakeholder management1. The 
shareholders have a formal influence at the annual shareholders’ meeting, and quarterly 
shareholder committee meetings keep them informed about major issues. The shareholders 
appoint new members of the supervisory board.  
 
The PoR organisation changed considerably after corporatisation. The executive board was 
expanded with a CFO, whereas prior to corporatisation the highest financial officer was not 
an executive board member. PoR also needed to attract capital directly from the capital 
market, instead of through the municipality of Rotterdam. Furthermore, the two commercial 
departments were considerably expanded, and for each department a new commercial 
director was appointed with a strong industry track record. The vast majority of newly 
appointed senior managers since corporatisation have private sector experience and were 
hired externally, as opposed to internal promotions. Other major changes included the 
development of a risk management team and outsourcing of most operational ICT activities. 
The organisational chart after the corporate restructuring process is shown in Figure A in the 
Appendix. 
 
4. Performance indicators  
 
Following Kaplan and Norton (1992), an evaluation of the performance of PoR needs to be 
balanced, and not solely focused on a single indicator like profitability. Our assessment of the 
effects of corporatisation includes a set of eight indicators that will be described in this 
section: market share, turnover, turnover per employee, operating costs, EBITDA (earnings 
                                                 
1  The background of the members of the supervisory board of PoR can be found at 
http://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/Port-authority/organisation/Pages/supervisory-board.aspx. 
 7
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization), net profit (earnings after interest, taxes 
and depreciation), profit per employee, and investments. We acknowledge that these 
performance indicators are interrelated. For instance, EDITBA is mainly driven by turnover 
and operating costs, and market share influences turnover. Such interrelations are widely 
acknowledged in strategy research (Bryant et al, 2004). Various scholars have developed one 
aggregated performance construct based on a number of indicators. However, Richard et al 
(2009) show that such constructs may not always be valid. Thus, we use various performance 
indicators. The benefit of using multiple performance measures has been shown (Chen and 
Dodd, 1997). Richard et al (2009) also suggest the use of various performance indicators to 
allow for triangulation.  
 
Table 1 contains information on these indicators and on some other variables related to PoR. 
The table shows the development of these variables over two seven-year periods: pre-
corporatisation (1997-2003) and post-corporatisation (2005-2011). Such a time frame is 
sufficiently long to overcome random variation (Richard et al, 2009; Kirby, 2005). In our 
analysis, we omit the transition year 2004, because in that year a large provision made for 
potential losses was included in the profit and loss account. If 2004 were chosen as starting 
point of the post-corporatisation period, this would overestimate the corporatisation benefits. 
With the exception of market share, all other performance indicators are expressed in real 
terms (in prices of 2011, after correction for the Dutch inflation relevant for PoR)2. 
 
<< Table 1 to be included about here. >> 
 
Market share is a key indicator of competitiveness that is widely used in performance 
evaluation (Rust and Zahorik, 1993), also specifically for ports (Notteboom, 2006; 
Haezendonck et al, 2006). The market share of Rotterdam in the Hamburg Le Havre range 
declined from 38.6% in 1997 to 35.1% in 2003, and after corporatisation, it increased from 
35.4% in 2005 to 37.0% in 2011. Rotterdam has a large share of crude oil and dry bulk 
throughput, and both market segments are mature with low growth rates. Competing ports 
like Hamburg and Antwerp are more specialised in container trade, the fastest growing 
market segment. For this reason, the rise in the Rotterdam overall market share was relatively 
modest up to 2008, but it improved in a declining market since the economic crisis in 2009 
                                                 
2  Data on Dutch inflation were obtained from the Dutch Statistical Agency (CBS, 2012). 
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when Rotterdam suffered relatively less than most other ports in the Hamburg Le Havre 
range. Specifically for containers, Rotterdam’s market share declined sharply in the period 
1997-2003 and remained stable in the period 2005-2011. 
 
Productivity, expressed as turnover per employee, is an indicator of the efficiency of 
company processes. Productivity is often used as performance indicator in data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) studies, for example, with application to airports in Gillen and Lall (1997) 
and to terminals in Bichou (2011). Turnover of PoR was rather stable prior to corporatisation, 
but it has increased considerably afterwards. Employment and operating costs rose prior to 
corporatisation and declined afterwards, partly owing to outsourcing that resulted in 
efficiency gains. Employee productivity, measured as turnover per employee, deteriorated 
prior to corporatisation, but it improved substantially afterwards. Mayston (1985) suggests 
operating costs as a performance indicator for not-for-profit organisations, and Rao and Holt 
(2005) use this indicator for supply chains. Lower operational costs lead to higher profits and 
enable more investments, which enhance the competitiveness of the port.  
 
Although PoR still is a not-for-profit organisation, corporatisation has led to an increasingly 
commercial approach to port development. Profitability is therefore a relevant performance 
indicator (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Prior to corporatisation, EBITDA declined 
and net profit remained stable, whereas both indicators improved substantially after 
corporatisation. Over the period from 2005 to 2011, EBITDA rose by 50% and net profit by 
140%. As employment declined over this period, the profit per employee rose even more. 
Investments are another relevant performance indicator (Kaplan and Norton, 2001), as 
investments of the port authority are its main instrument for port development. In the years 
prior to corporatisation, investments actually declined. From 1997 to 2003, the organisation 
grew in terms of staff but declined in terms of investments made in the port. This trend has 
been reverted after corporatisation, as investments have grown very rapidly from about 150 
million euro in 2005 to nearly 500 million euro in 2011. This rise is largely due to the PoR 
expansion project ‘Maasvlakte 2’. The corporatisation and the equity provided by the Dutch 
state were specifically designed to enhance the investment capacity of PoR. Thus, the growth 
in investments is largely due to corporatisation. However, this cannot be regarded as evidence 
for a better ‘post corporatisation performance’, as another arrangement enabling the Dutch 
state to invest in ‘Maasvlakte 2’ (e.g., a subsidy to PoR) would also have led to a huge 
growth of investments.    
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Apart from information on performance indicators, Table 1 also provides some contextual 
information. The volume of leased land shows an ongoing process of attracting new 
customers. The number of ship visits is relevant for the operational costs of the harbour 
master activities, where about half the PoR staff is employed. The throughput growth rate in 
the Rotterdam harbour did not catch up with competing harbours prior to corporatisation, but 
it outperformed the competitors afterwards. The overall market share of the port of Rotterdam 
declined prior to corporatisation and recovered afterwards. Port dues and land rents are the 
two principal revenue streams, and both increased considerably after corporatisation.3  
 
5. Evaluation of corporatisation effects 
 
In the previous section, we discussed the development of eight performance indicators 
(market share, turnover, turnover per employee, operating costs, EBITDA, net profit, profit 
per employee, and investments) over two seven-year periods: pre-corporatisation (1997-
2003) and post-corporatisation (2005-2011). Figure 1 shows the yearly growth percentages of 
these indicators. With the exception of market share, all other indicators are expressed in real 
terms (in prices of 2011, after correction for local inflation relevant for PoR). Figure 2 is 
similar to Figure 1, but all yearly growth rates (except for market share) are now corrected for 
the yearly growth in world GDP (21.6% in 1997-2003 and 9.7% in 2005-2011).4  
 
<< Figures 1 and 2 to be included about here. >> 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate substantial improvements of all performance indicators since 
corporatisation, but Figures 1 and 2 show that these indicators contain a considerable amount 
of variation over time. We therefore test for the significance of these improvements by means 
of statistical tests for the comparison of two groups, where one group is period 1997-2003 
and the other group is 2005-2011. We apply two common and popular tests for the 
comparison of two groups (both are described in any statistical textbook, see for example 
                                                 
3  Another performance indicator of interest is customer satisfaction, which improved from 7.0 in 2004 to 7.2 in 2009  
(Port of Rotterdam, 2010). This indicator is not collected annually, and it is therefore not included in Table 1. 
4  World GDP growth data were obtained from the World Economic Outlook Database of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2012). 
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Moore et al, 2011). The first test is the conventional (parametric) t-test for the comparison of 
the mean growth rates of the indicator in the two periods (for non-paired observations, with 
or without pooled variance depending on whether the variances in both periods differ 
significantly or not). The number of observations in each group is seven, which is quite small, 
and validity of the t-test requires that the indicator scores are reasonably normally distributed 
in each group. As normality may be doubtful, we perform also the (non-parametric) 
Wilcoxon rank sum test for non-paired observations. This test is based on rank scores and 
does not require any distributional assumptions of the indicator scores. The Wilcoxon test is 
insensitive to extreme values of the growth rates, at the expense of loss of power to 
distinguish between the two periods.   
 
<< Table 2 to be included about here. >> 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the two statistical tests for the difference of the real growth 
rates of each indicator in the pre- and post-corporatisation periods, both with and without 
correction for GDP growth. The main outcomes are as follows. After corporatisation, the 
growth rates of the following performance indicators have improved significantly (at the 5% 
level): market share, turnover per employee, operating costs, and EBITDA. As the sample 
size in each group is small (seven yearly growth rates before and after corporatisation), it is 
also of interest to consider which indicators have improved significantly at the 10% level: 
profit per employee and investments. Finally, turnover and net profit have increased at a 
significance level of 10% if evaluated by the mean, but not significantly if evaluated in terms 
of rank scores.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The performance of the port of Rotterdam Authority (PoR) has improved considerably since 
corporatisation in 2004. This improvement is found for all eight considered performance 
indicators: market share, turnover, turnover per employee, operating costs, EBITDA, net 
profit, profit per employee, and investments. Statistical tests show that, in terms of the yearly 
growth rates before and after corporatisation, the improvements are most significant for 
market share, turnover per employee, operating costs, and EBITDA. 
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The results for the specific PoR case of this paper do not allow for empirical generalisation 
but only for analytical generalisation (Yin, 2008). Thus one cannot conclude that 
corporatisation of port authorities always leads to a better performance (empirical 
generalisation). The results of the case do allow the development of theories and hypotheses 
(analytical generalisation). We argue that three insights from the PoR case are of special 
relevance for port authorities.  
 
First, the PoR case suggests that local politicians may have insufficient capabilities and 
incentives to monitor port authorities appropriately. Even though the operating environment 
of port authorities is very distinct from most public activities, most port authorities are 
governed mainly by politicians or public sector professionals (Brooks and Pallis, 2011). More 
research is needed on the board composition (Dalton et al, 1998) of port authorities and its 
impact on performance. 
 
Second, in the absence of effective monitoring, port authorities run the risk of becoming 
effectively self-governing organisations at the expense of effective cost control. The PoR 
case shows that, prior to corporatisation, PoR could afford to grow in employment size and 
operational costs while investments declined. If this trend would have continued, operational 
costs in 2011 would have been roughly 30 million higher than they actually are. Thus, further 
research on the control of operational costs of port authorities is relevant. In this respect it is 
relevant to mention that operational costs for PoR (around €0.50 per ton throughput) are 
substantially lower than those for landlord port authorities like Antwerp (around €1.30), 
Hamburg (around €1.30), Barcelona (around €1.70), and Amsterdam (around €0.80). These 
cost figures are based on publicly available data from the annual reports of these ports. This 
does not provide evidence that PoR is better in operating cost control. It may simply reflect 
differences in the scope between port authorities (e.g. the port authority in Antwerp also 
offers towage services). Further research on operational costs, with larger samples including 
several ports over longer observation periods, may yield relevant insights on the relation 
between port governance structures and operating cost control. 
 
Third, the PoR case suggests that a corporatized setting may lead to an inflow of senior 
managers with a commercial background. This may lead to  a stronger market orientation 
after corporatisation, with potential effects on the performance of the port authority. This 
research issue could be expanded, for instance by applying insights from strategy research on 
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market orientation (Narver and Slater, 1990) to the case of port authorities. Research on user 
satisfaction of port authorities (Brooks and Pallis, 2008) is another avenue that can build on 
the insights of this case study. Many port customers have frequent interactions with the port 
authority and directly experience the impact of port authority investments and policies. Such 
users are likely to have an informed opinion on the performance of port authorities. 
Analysing whether differences in port user satisfaction are related to port governance models 
may provide useful additional insights for port governance. 
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Appendix: Port of Rotterdam organisation chart in 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Yearly growth percentages of performance indicators (1997-2003, 2005-2011) 
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Figure 2: Yearly growth percentages of performance indicators, after correction for the 
growth in world GDP (1997-2003, 2005-2011) 
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